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Causes and Consequences of 
Unequal Federal Taxation and 
Spending across Regions
David Albouy 
Most national governments exercise sovereignty over 
large geographic areas, comprising a multitude of economi-
cally diverse cities and politically heterogeneous regions. 
Unlike local governments, which typically must spend 
revenues in the same area in which they are raised, national 
governments face no such constraints and can effectively 
redistribute funds from one area to another by letting some 
areas receive more spending, net of taxes, than others. While 
an enormous literature has studied the causes and conse-
quences of taxation and spending at the purely national and 
purely local levels, surprisingly little research has examined 
how or why national governments may tax and spend differ-
ently across different areas.
The fi rst and main chapter of the dissertation explains 
how a simple federal income tax, levied according to the 
same tax formula across areas, will fall more heavily on 
some areas than others, affecting the distribution of employ-
ment, wages, and property values nationwide. This happens 
because otherwise identical workers get paid different wages 
due to cost-of-living and quality-of-life differences across 
areas. Workers are effectively taxed for living in areas where 
fi rms offer higher wages. According to Roback (1982), when 
workers are fully mobile, these are areas that are either more 
effi cient in producing goods traded across cities, offer a 
lower quality-of-life, or have ineffi cient housing sectors. 
The federal tax differences workers pay are simply pro-
portional to the marginal federal tax rate times the wage pre-
mium a worker earns for taking a job in a given city, relative 
to the national average. Since the effective federal marginal 
tax rate is close to 35 percent, the standard deviation of wage 
differences across cities is 13 percent (see below), and three-
quarters of income accrues to labor, these tax differentials 
across cities have a standard deviation of about 3 percent of 
total income. These differences are similar in magnitude to 
local tax differences, except that higher federal taxes are not 
compensated for with higher federal spending. This creates a 
tax wedge that encourages workers to live in low-wage areas 
rather than high-wage areas, resulting in an ineffi cient distri-
bution of employment nationwide. Furthermore, less-mobile 
workers and land owners in high-wage cities disproportion-
ately bear federal taxes and are made worse off than under a 
system of neutral geographic taxation.
Several policies can be used to alter the distribution of 
federal taxes across regions, some of which have been sug-
gested, albeit less rigorously, by economists and policymak-
ers. Indexing federal taxes to local wage levels so that work-
ers in different cities have their taxable incomes adjusted to 
refl ect what they would earn in an average city is the proper 
way to equalize taxes and make employment distributed 
effi ciently. Creating such an index presents a number of prac-
tical challenges. The arguably easier task of indexing taxes 
to cost of living can improve effi ciency by helping workers 
locate closer to good-paying jobs in expensive areas; it can 
also induce too many workers to live in areas with a high 
quality of life by effectively subsidizing the consumption 
of local amenities that lead to higher costs. Cost-of-living 
indexation will improve locational effi ciency only if cost of 
living varies across cities suffi ciently from worker productiv-
ity differences rather than from quality-of-life differences.
The chapter also shows that existing provisions in the tax 
code that lower the after-tax price of owner-occupied hous-
ing already act as a mild form of cost-of-living indexation. 
As the demand for housing is price inelastic, when individu-
als move to more expensive areas, their expenditures on 
housing rise. However, as the demand for housing is not per-
fectly inelastic, housing expenditures rise less than one-for-
one with the price level. Because of this, and because not all 
cost-of-living differences are due to housing costs, these tax 
provisions only serve to index taxes partially to local costs of 
living. Furthermore, across areas with the same price level, 
workers in areas with a higher quality of life earn lower 
wages (they are in less-productive areas) and thus consume 
less in housing as well as other goods. Because of this, tax 
benefi ts for owner-occupied housing do not benefi t workers 
in nicer areas as much as prices alone would suggest. 
U.S. census microdata on individuals and housing from 
2000 are used to estimate wage and cost-of-living differences 
across metropolitan areas in the United States, seen in Figure 
3, following a methodology similar to Beeson and Eberts 
(1989). Calculations from these differences demonstrate that 
federal tax differences in the United States, seen in Figure 4, 
are quite large, and that tax-benefi ts to owner-occupied hous-
ing reduce these differences, but only by a small amount. 
Overall, workers who live in areas offering above-average 
nominal wages pay an average federal tax rate of almost 20 
percent, while otherwise identical workers in cities offering 
below-average wages pay an average federal tax rate under 
15 percent. This difference of roughly 5 percent of total 
income is higher than many state sales tax rates.  The differ-
ence between the most-taxed area, the San Francisco Bay 
Area, and the least-taxed area, rural South Dakota, is almost 
14 percent of total income, a difference that swamps almost 
all local and state tax differences.
An analysis using data from the Consolidated Federal 
Funds Report reveals that cities paying higher federal taxes 
are not compensated with higher federal spending: federal 
tax and spending differences across metro areas appear 
uncorrelated. Thus, unlike higher local taxes, higher federal 
taxes are particularly burdensome for local economies as 
they are not compensated for with higher levels of spend-
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ing. This analysis bolsters the conclusion of Senator Patrick 
Moynihan in his 24 years of reports, entitled The Federal 
Budget and the States, that the “federal balance of payments” 
across areas is highly unequal, showing that this conclusion 
continues to hold even after controlling for the differing 
characteristics of individuals across areas.
Using these estimates, a calibrated general equilibrium 
model—similar in some ways to that in Rappaport (2006)—
is used to gauge the long-run effect on metro areas of federal 
tax differences, present since the two world wars. This model 
fi nds that federal taxes have lowered housing and land values 
by roughly 4 and 25 percent in high-wage cities, while 
similarly raising values in low-wage areas. Furthermore, 
based on estimates in Bartik (1991) and other evidence, it ap-
pears that long-run employment is about 15 percent lower in 
both high- and low-wage areas than under a geographically 
neutral federal tax system. The simulation lends credence 
to the observation made by journalist Malcolm Gladwell 
(1996) that “the decline of northeastern American cities 
may be due… to the emptying of their coffers by the federal 
government.”  
The redistribution of employment across cities caused by 
federal taxes creates locational ineffi ciencies worth about 
0.28 percent of income, or $34 billion, in 2005. This effi -
ciency cost is similar in size to the effi ciency cost due to tax 
benefi ts for owner-occupied housing.
Policy simulations reveal a number of interesting conclu-
sions. First, while wage-indexation of taxes would be supe-
rior to cost-of-living indexation, cost-of-living indexation 
appears to be superior to no indexation at all, even if the 
tax-benefi ts to owner-occupied housing are retained. Second, 
increasing tax-benefi ts to owner-occupied housing would 
help to equalize federal taxes somewhat and would lower 
the effi ciency cost due to worker misallocation across cities, 
but would lead to a welfare loss overall as the effi ciency cost 
increase in the housing-consumption market would be even 
greater.
The research in this dissertation goes well beyond what 
the previous literature had discovered about how federal 
taxes interact with local prices, a literature that is too nar-
row or informal to guide policy comprehensively. Wildasin 
(1980) notes that federal taxes on labor income may cause 
workers to locate ineffi ciently, but he does not describe this 
as unequal federal taxation or discuss its impact on local 
economies. Glaeser (1998) argues that federal transfers 
should not be tied to local price levels, as this effectively 
subsidizes workers to live in high quality-of-life cities. Con-
sidering also productivity differences across cities, Kaplow 
(1996) and Knoll and Griffi th (2003) argue that there may be 
a benefi t of indexing taxes to local wage levels, but do not 
provide a quantitative assessment of how this would change 
things relative to the current unindexed system. The unequal 
geographic distribution of tax benefi ts for owner-occupied 
housing is measured by Gyourko and Sinai (2003), although 
they do not consider how these interact with the overall 
distribution of federal taxes or control for differences in the 
population across metro areas.
The policy discussion and simulations in this paper pro-
vide some guidance to the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax 
Reform (2005), which recommended cutting tax deductions 
for local taxes and home-mortgage interest. According to the 
simulation, this would produce effi ciency gains, although 
it would make federal taxes more unequal across areas and 
make workers locate even more ineffi ciently across cities. 
The simulations are also useful in analyzing the proposal 
that tax deductions for home mortgage interest be indexed 
to local price levels. For individuals who consume just over 
the cap, this would produce a stronger form of cost-of-living 
indexation, as the size of the deduction increases one-for-one 
with the price level for housing. This opens up the possibility 
of capping deductions to keep individuals from consuming 
too much housing on the margin, while still helping individu-
als purchase housing close to high-paying jobs. 
Also within this chapter are several methodological con-
tributions to the areas of quality of life, amenity valuation, 
and worker mobility across metro ares. Hedonic estimates of 
quality of life across cities are measured according to how 
high the cost of living in a city is relative to its local wage-
level. The model used in the dissertation adjusts the standard 
hedonic model seen in previous work (e.g., Blomquist et al. 
1988) to account for federal taxes, nonhousing costs, and 
nonlabor income. This produces quality-of-life estimates that 
are much more favorable to cities on the coasts and to larger 
cities. For instance, Santa Barbara, Honolulu, and San Fran-
cisco are ranked in the top fi ve, while previously these had 
ranked these far lower. Later work (Albouy 2008) shows that 
these adjusted quality-of-life estimates produce city rankings 
closer to those in the popular press and that the calibrated 
model accurately predicts how housing prices rise with wage 
levels, controlling for amenities. Further empirical analysis 
reveals that good weather and coastal location alone account 
for a majority of quality-of-life differences.
A number of insights on how the values of amenities 
are capitalized into local prices are also developed. These 
amenities can not only include fi xed characteristics such 
as weather, but also policy variables such as public infra-
structure, spending initiatives, and local taxes. Federal taxes 
increase the local value of amenities that improve quality-of-
life or effi ciency in the housing sector, while they decrease 
the value of amenities that are good for businesses that sell 
goods tradable across cities. Standard formulas used to value 
amenities need to be adjusted to measure the true economic 
value of amenities, rather than the local value after changes 
in federal tax burden. This work also models how amenities 
are capitalized differently into housing prices than in land 
prices because housing services are produced using local 
labor and mobile capital, as well as land. Because land val-
ues only make up a fraction of home values, formulas must 
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take into account that a small percentage increase in housing 
value will refl ect a much larger percentage increase in land 
value. Also, when land values are not available, amenities 
that increase the productivity in the tradable sector cannot be 
readily distinguished from amenities that decrease productiv-
ity in the housing (nontradable) sector, as both lead to higher 
housing prices and wages.
Extension of the model discussed in the Appendix incor-
porate an elegant adaptation of the Roback framework to 
account for imperfect mobility, modeled through the hetero-
geneity of tastes or attachments for living in a particular city. 
This adaptation uses a single parameter that maps directly to 
the elasticity of local labor supply, measured in number of 
employees, or the elastic of demand of households to live in 
that particular city. Estimates of this mobility parameter can 
then be used to adjust formulas of how changes in federal 
taxes or local amenities affect local wages, employment, 
and land and housing values. The situations where workers 
are perfectly mobile or immobile are treated as special cases 
of when the mobility parameter takes on values of zero or 
infi nity.
Of course, reforms to equalize the distribution of taxation 
and spending across regions require political approval. Most 
practical reforms would require some areas to receive less in 
federal funds while others would gain, generating a politi-
cal confl ict across regions. How such confl ict is resolved 
is a common theme in distributional politics. In the United 
States, equalizing the distribution of federal taxes across ar-
eas would likely lead to partisan confl ict, as most high-wage 
areas tend to elect Democratic representatives at the federal 
level, while many low-wage areas tend to elect Republican 
representatives, refl ecting the so-called “red-state/blue-state” 
division of the country.
The second chapter of the dissertation considers how the 
partisan makeup of an area’s federal legislative representa-
tives can infl uence the type or amount of spending that area 
receives. The standard legislative bargaining model of Baron 
and Ferejohn (1987) is adapted to incorporate political par-
ties, which is used to model how power imbalances can arise 
between majority and minority parties for at least two rea-
sons. First, members of the majority party may have greater 
ability to propose spending bills, which are destined to favor 
the proposer. Second, with majority voting and suffi cient par-
ty-discipline, spending bills can be passed using only votes 
from members of the majority party, thus excluding members 
of the minority, who are then less likely to receive distribu-
tional benefi ts. Furthermore, with a breakdown in electoral 
competition, ideological differences between parties imply 
that the party affi liation of a representative may infl uence the 
composition of spending his district receives, favoring some 
types of spending over others.
Looking at the U.S. Congress, it is diffi cult to tease out 
these different bargaining effects from the data, as the actual 
bargaining process is more complicated than in a simple 
game-theoretic model. Nevertheless, some interesting pat-
terns emerge from the data. Empirical estimates—using 
within-state variation based on fi xed-effect and (quasi-ex-
perimental) regression-discontinuity designs—fi nd that states 
represented by congressmen in the majority receive greater 
federal grants, especially in transportation. Weaker evidence 
suggests this greater bargaining power comes more from 
party-coalition effects than from proposal power differences. 
States represented by Republican congressmen receive 
substantially more defense spending than those represented 
by Democratic congressmen; the latter receive signifi cantly 
more spending for education. 
Until recently, disentangling ideological effects from 
majority effects had been almost impossible with exist-
ing data as Democrats held the majority in the Senate until 
1980 and the House until 1994. The only existing work in 
the area, Levitt and Snyder (1995), is purely cross-sectional, 
confounding Democratic with majority status, and fi nds no 
effect by geographic area. This chapter suggests that partisan 
representation is important but not overwhelming in deter-
mining the geographic distribution of federal funds.
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